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Abstract
Part I of this Note examines the difference in respective emphasis placed by United States and
English admiralty law upon responsibility of a corporate employee and the employee’s position
in the corporate hierarchy in determining the employer’s right to limit liability. Part II analyzes
the extent to which shipowners in England and the United States are allowed to delegate their
responsibilities in ensuring the seaworthiness of their vessels. Part III of this Note argues that
under English admiralty law, limitation of liability is granted where none is warranted. This Note
concludes by recommending the United States standard for finding privity.
THE CONTINUING CONFLICT BETWEEN UNITED
STATES AND ENGLISH ADMIRALTY LAW ON
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY: WHOSE
PRIVITY BINDS THE CORPORATE SHIPOWNER?
INTRODUCTION
Under both United States and English admiralty law, a
shipowner remains liable under the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior for the negligent acts of his employees that occur during
the scope of their employment. If the casualty occurred with-
out his privity or knowledge, however, the shipowner will not
be fully liable for damages.' Since the advent of the corpora-
l. In the United States, a shipowner's ability to limit his liability is controlled by
the Limitation Act of 1851, 9 Stat. 635 (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (1982))
[hereinafter Limitation Act]. Section 183(a) of the Limitation Act states in relevant
part:
The liability of the owner of any vessel ... for any loss, damage, or injury by
collision ... occasioned... without the privity ... of the owner... shall not
... exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel,
and her freight then pending.
Id.
While under United States law a shipowner's liability is limited to the value of his
vessel after the casualty, in England a shipowner's liability is determined by the size
of his vessel. Section 503 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., Ch. 60,
339, 519 provides as follows:
(1) The owners of a ship, British or foreign, shall not, where.., all or any
[loss] . . . take[s] place without their actual fault or privity; ...
be liable to damages beyond the following amounts; ...
(ii) an aggregate amount not exceeding eight pounds for each ton of
their ship's tonnage.
The Merchant Shipping Act 1894 was amended by the Merchant Shipping (Lia-
bility of Shipowners and Others) Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2 Ch. 62 [hereinafter
Merchant Shipping Act 1958]. While the "fault or privity" clause remains the same,
section 71.1 (1) of the 1958 Act changed the basis of calculation from the pound ster-
ling to the gold franc.
The 1976 Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) Con-
vention on Limitation of Liability provides that a shipowner will not be entitled to
limit his liability only if he intentionally or recklessly causes the casualty. See 6 A.
JENNER, B. CHASE,J. Loo, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 5-32.1-5-44.1 (M.M. Coen 7th ed.
1986) [hereinafter 6 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY]. The Merchant Shipping Act, 1979,
Eliz. Ch. 39 was based upon the 1976 Convention, however, the 1979 Act has no
statutory effect until it is ratified by the required minimum number of twelve states.
C. HILL, MARITIME LAw 265 (1981). The Convention has been ratified by the re-
quired minimum number of nations, and came into force December 1, 1986. 6 BENE-
DICT ON ADMIRALTY § 5-44.1. The arguments presented in this note are still applica-
ble, as the courts would be required to decide whose intent or recklessness will be
imputed to the corporation.
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tion as a vehicle for facilitating maritime affairs, the courts in
England and the United States have applied various standards
in ascertaining when a corporation is in privity with its employ-
ees' negligence in order to determine liability of the corpora-
tion.2 Given that corporations operate through individuals,
the privity or knowledge of individuals at a certain level of re-
sponsibility must be deemed the privity or knowledge of the
corporation; otherwise, the corporation would always enjoy
limited liability.3 It is the different interpretations of what con-
stitutes privity and, thus, how liability will be determined, that
has created a conflict between English and United States admi-
ralty law. This disparity can result in significantly different
awards to claimants. Where a choice of law issue exists it will
be in the best interests of claimants to avoid application of
English limitation law.4
Part I of this Note examines the difference in respective
emphasis placed by United States and English admiralty law
upon responsibility of a corporate employee and the em-
ployee's position in the corporate hierarchy in determining the
employer's right to limit liability. Part II analyzes the extent to
which shipowners in England and the United States are al-
lowed to delegate their responsibilities in ensuring the seawor-
thiness of their vessels. Part III of this Note argues that under
English admiralty law, limitation of liability is granted where
none is warranted. This Note concludes by recommending the
United States standard for finding privity.
2. See, e.g., Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc. v. Hicks (The Linseed King), 285 U.S.
502 (1932); Continental Oil v. Bonanza Corp., 706 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1982); Len-
nard's Carrying Co., Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co., Ltd. 1915 A.C. 705 (H.L.); Grand
Champion Tankers Ltd. v. Norpipe A/S, [1984] 2 W.L.R. 942 (H.L.), The Marion,
[1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 156 (C.A.), [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 52 (Q.B. Adm. Ct.).
The doctrine of limitation of liability for shipowners has in recent years been
attacked by some members of the legal community as being unnecessary since it is no
longer needed to encourage investment in maritime ventures because of the corpo-
rate form and insurance to insulate investors. It does not appear likely, however, that
the legislative bodies of England and the United States will in the near future elim-
linate this protection given shipowners. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
3. See Coryell v. Phipps (The Seminole), 317 U.S. 406, 407-08 (1943).
4. It is problematic whether United States courts would hold that English limita-
tion law is substantive or procedural. See Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Mellor (The
Titanic) 233 U.S. 718 (1914); see also Black Diamond v. Stewart & Sons (The Norwalk
Victory) 336 U.S. 386 (1949); Petition of Chadade S.S. Co., Inc. (The Yarmouth Cas-
tle), 1967 A.M.C. 1843; G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 10-4 (2d
ed. 1975).
339
340 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 10:388
I. TITLE VERSUS RESPONSIBILITY
Both United States 5 and English 6 courts have used the
term "alter ego" to describe the person whose privity will be
imputed to the corporation. How that term is defined by the
respective courts, however, greatly differs. Under English law
the emphasis is placed upon a mechanical and formalistic iden-
tification of the employee's position in the corporate hierarchy;
thus the title of the corporate employee is very important. In
the United States, by contrast, the emphasis is placed upon ef-
fective control of the corporation's vessel at the time of the
casualty.
A. The Corporate Alter Ego
1. The United States Standard.
In the United States the responsibility of an employee, not
his title, determines whether limitation will be denied.7 The
term managing officer8 is used to describe someone who has
the requisite authority to bind the corporation. A managing
officer is "not necessarily one of the executive officers, but is
any one to whom the corporation has committed the general
management or general superintendence of the whole or a
particular part of its business."9 Privity or knowledge will be
attributed to the corporation by the act of a managing officer
"whose scope of authority includes supervision over the phase
of the business out of which the loss or injury occurred."' 0
Thus, employees with discretionary powers, as distinguished
from employees without managerial powers, bind a corpora-
tion by their privity or knowledge." I This standard is in direct
5. The Silverpalm, 94 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938).
6. See, e.g., Northern Fishing Co. (Hull), Ltd. v. Eddam and Others, (The Nor-
man), [1960] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1 (H.L.); The Lady Gwendolen, [1965] 1 Lloyd's Rep.
335 (C.A.).
7. See In re P. Sanford Ross, Inc. 204 F. 248, 251 (2d Cir. 1913). "[Tlhe ... test is
not as to their being [corporate] officers in a strict sense but as to the largeness of
their authority." Id.
8. See Craig v. Continental Ins. Co., 141 U.S. 638, 646 (1891); Moore-McCor-
mack Lines, Inc. v. Armco Steel Corp. (The Mormackite), 272 F.2d 873, 876 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 990 (1960).
9. The Erie Lighter 108, 250 F. 490, 494 (D.N.J. 1918).
10. Coryell v. Phipps (The Seminole), 317 U.S. 406, 410.
11. See 3 A. JENNER, B. CHASE, M. CHYNSKY &J.G. GRIEDER, BENEDICT ON ADMI-
RALTY 5-14 (7th ed. 1985) [hereinafter 3 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY].
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contrast to that applied by the English courts.
2. The English Standard.
While the English courts have also used the term "alter
ego" to describe an individual whose privity will be imputed to
the corporation,1 2 the English courts define that person more
narrowly. In order for an individual to be the corporation's
alter ego, that person must be a director of the corporation, or
have powers coordinate with the board of directors as granted
by the corporation's articles of association,' 3 relying on Len-
nard's Carrying Co., Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. :14
[A corporation's] active and directing will must conse-
quently be sought in the person of somebody who for some
purposes may be called an agent, but who is really the di-
recting mind and will of the corporation, the very ego and
centre of the personality of the corporation...
It must be . . . that the fault or privity is the fault or
privity of somebody who is not merely a servant or agent for
whom the company is liable upon the footing respondeat
superior, but somebody for whom the company is liable be-
cause his action is the very action of the company itself.'5
Thus, such person is the "very ego and centre of the per-
sonality of the corporation" as follows: 16
That person may be under the direction of the shareholders
in general meeting, that person may be the board of direc-
tors itself, or it may be... that person has authority co-ordi-
nate with the board of directors given to him under the arti-
cles of association, and is appointed by the general meeting
of the company, and can only be removed by the general
meeting of the company. 17
Thus, for fault of the corporation there must be fault of a
member of the board of directors, unless there is some other
12. See, e.g., Northern Fishing Co. (Hull), Ltd. v. Eddam & Others, (The Nor-
man), [1960] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1, 10 (H.L.); The Lady Gwendolen, [1965] 1 Lloyd's
Rep. 335, 336 (C.A.).
13. See, e.g., The Marion, [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 52, 71 (Q.B. Adm. Ct.); The
Garden City 2 [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 382, 398 (Q.B. Adm. Ct.).
14. Lennard's Carrying Co., Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co., Ltd., 1915 A.C. 705.
15. Id. at 713-14.
16. Id. at 713.
17. Id.
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person who was appointed by general meeting 8 of the com-
pany 9 and who has authority, coordinate with that of the
board of directors, granted to him by the corporation's articles
of association.20  In contrast to the United States law,2' Eng-
lish admiralty law regards a marine superintendent's 22 knowl-
edge or fault insufficient to charge the corporation with fault
or privity. 23
B. Effective Control: The Power to Exercise Authority.
In the United States the leading case of Spencer Kellogg &
Sons v. Hicks (The Linseed King) 24 sets standards for ascertaining
when the privity or knowledge of a managing officer will be
imputed to the corporation. Thus the managing officer must
have authority over the phase of the business out of which the
casualty occurred, and ability to exercise that authority.2 5 That
is, he must have effective control over that phase of the ship-
owner's business.
In The Linseed King, a corporation operated a launch across
the Hudson River between Manhattan and its New Jersey plant
18. The articles of association contain the internal regulations of the company
and govern its administration, as well as the relations between the corporation and its
shareholders, and among the shareholders themselves. S. SHAW & D. SMITH, THE
LAW OF MEETINGS: THEIR CONDUCT AND PROCEDURE 67 (5th ed. 1979). Upon a com-
pany's incorporation, the articles of association must be registered with the Registrar
of Companies for England and Wales. Id.
19. The Marion, [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 52, 71 (Q.B. Adm. Ct.).
20. S. SHAW & D. SMITH, supra, note 18, at 130.
The expression 'general meeting' . . . [is] employed to describe any meeting
which all those members [shareholders] of a company who have a right to
vote are entitled to attend. It is thus opposed to a 'class meeting' to which
only the holders of a certain class or classes of shares are summoned.
Id.
21. See Sanbern v. Wright & Cobb Lighterage Co., 171 F. 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1909),
aff'd, 179 F. 1021 (2d. Cir. 1910); infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
22. Under United States law, a marine superintendent would be considered a
managing officer because he has discretionary powers. See, e.g., Northern Petroleum
Tank S.S. Co. v. City of New York (The Dongan Hills), 282 F.2d 120 (2d. Cir. 1960);
Sanbern v. Wright & Cobb Lighterage Co., 171 F. 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1909), aff'd, 179 F.
1021 (2d. Cir. 1910); Parsons v. Empire Trans. Co., 111 F. 202 (9th Cir. 1901), cert.
denied, 183 U.S. 699 (1901). Hence, his actions or knowledge would be imputed to
the corporation.
23. Smitton v. Orient Nav. Co., [1907] 12 Com. Cas. 270.
24. Spencer Kellogg & Sons v. Hicks (The Linseed King), 285 U.S. 502 (1932).
25. Id. at 511.
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as a ferry for its employees. 26 Because the launch was un-
seaworthy in ice,27 the corporation's headquarters told the
plant manager not to operate the vessel when ice was on the
river. 28 The ferry's master disobeyed the order with the result
that the vessel struck ice and sank with great loss of life.29
Although the master had acted in direct contravention of man-
agement's instructions, the Court held that the owners were
not entitled to limit their liability, 30 since the opportunity ex-
isted to consult with the master about that day's operating con-
ditions, l in contrast to a ship on the high seas, where the
owner must rely on the master's reasonable judgement in
obeying orders. If the plant manager had used reasonable dili-
gence the morning of the sinking he would have been aware of
the icy condition of the river and been able to prevent the
ferry's sailing.3 2 The Court stated that the negligence that
caused the casualty was that of the plant manager in failing to
prevent the master from operating the launch that morning,33
emphasizing that the plant manager had not only the duty and
authority to prevent river crossings in icy conditions, but also
the power to exercise this authority, because the vessel was
never far from his effective control.3 4 The Court concluded
that the scope of the plant manager's authority rendered his
privity or knowledge that of the corporation. 5 Conversely, the
English emphasis is on whether the individual was a director or
had powers of a director granted him by the articles of associa-
tion.3 6
The United States emphasis on authority and effective
control is reflected in a line of cases in which the privity or
knowledge of a corporate representative has been attributed to
the corporation when the employee had discretionary powers,
26. Id. at 506.
27. Id. at 510.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 507.
30. Id. at 512.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., The Marion, [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 52, 71 (Q.B. Adm. Ct.), The
Garden City [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 382, 398 (Q.B. Adm. Ct.).
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such as the power to maintain the vessel, hire crew members,
settle claims against the vessel, and enter into contracts for the
vessel. 37 For example, in The Marguerite W ,38 the court denied
limitation of liability when the shore captain, 9 who supervised
the corporation's towing operations, was aware that the crew
was negligently towing barges.4" In England, however, as the
captain was not a director, limitation might be granted as long
as the directors were unaware of the negligent practices of the
tugboat crews.
No United States court has denied a corporate shipowner
limitation of liability for a master's navigational errors at sea
when the owner exercised reasonable care in selecting the
master.4' When loss has been due to an error in navigation,
however, the shipowner must show that the navigators had the
required licenses, and present evidence ofjustifiable belief that
the navigators were competent and knowledgeable of their du-
ties.42 The shipowner must have instructed his servants as to
their duties43  and ensure that the vessel was properly
manned.44
37. See, e.g., Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Lloyd Brasilero, 159 F.2d 661 (2d Cir.
1947) (traffic manager deputied supervision over condition and repair of vessels in
foreign port), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 836 (1947); American Agr. Chem. Co. v.
O'Donnell Transp. Co. (The Hugh O'Donnell), 62 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1945)
(agent and dispatcher of barge line in charge of company operations in port where
the casualty occurred).
38. 49 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. Wis. 1943), aff'd sub nom. The Marguerite, 140 F.2d
491 (7th Cir. 1944).
39. 49 F. Supp. at 931. The managing agent in The Marguerite W., was Captain
Shaw, who was in charge of the upkeep and operations of the corporation's vessels in
Green Bay, Wisconsin. One year prior to the collision he was given the title of treas-
urer, although he had no authority to sign checks. He was given the title in order
that he would be able to board vessels prior to the arrival of customs officers, as
customs regulations prohibited that privilege to anyone but a vessel's master or an
officer of the corporation. Id.
40. Id. at 931-32.
41. Cf Gertrude Parker, Inc. v. Abrams, 178 F.2d 259 (1st Cir. 1949); Harbor
Towing Corp. v. Parker (The Ruth Conway), 75 F.Supp 514 (D.Md. 1947), aff'd, 171
F.2d 416 (4th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 907 (1949); Jacobus Grauwiller Co. v.
Reichert (The Mattie), 136 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1943).
42. See, e.g., Hercules Carriers Lim. Prosc., 1983 A.M.C. 2409 (D.Fla. 1983).
43. See Eastern S.S. Co. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 256 F. 497, 503-504
(1st Cir. 1919), cert. dismissed, 250 U.S. 676 (1919).
44. See W.E. Valliant & Co. v. Rayonier, Inc. (The E. Madison Hall), 140 F.2d
589 (4th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 748 (1944).
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II. DELEGATION OF THE SHIPO WNER'S RESPONSIBILITY
Shipowners may limit their liability if the owner's manage-
rial employees do not have privity or knowledge 45 or the ship-
owner has engaged competent people to inspect and repair the
vessel.46 Case law, however, indicates that an owner cannot
close his eyes to what prudent inspections would disclose.47
Denial of limitation for improper delegation involves either a
long-standing failure to inspect the vessel adequately or other-
wise exercise control over activities in the home port.4 8
In Sanbern v. Wright & Cobb Lighterage Co. ,41 the court found
that a lighter sank because it was unseaworthy. 50 A general su-
perintendent who had been responsible for seeing that the
firm's barges were in good condition,5 ' performed this duty in
a perfunctory manner, stating, "[I]f she wasn't leaking we
didn't spend any money."' 52 The barges were allowed to decay
until they developed obvious signs of weakness.5 3 Conse-
quently the court denied limitation. 4
An English court would probably not deny limitation
under these circumstances as the maintenance of the barges
had been delegated to a superintendent who was not a direc-
tor. Even though the barges decayed over a long period of
time, as long as the board of directors was unaware that the
superintendent was not performing his duties, limitation
would be granted.
45. See, e.g., Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Gay Cottons, 414 F.2d 724, 731 (9th Cir.
1969); Moore-McCormack Lines v. Armco Steel Corp. (The Mormackite), 272 F.2d
873, 876-77 (2d Cir. 1959); The South Coast, 71 F.2d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1934).
46. See, e.g., Flat-top Fuel Co. v. Martin, 85 F.2d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied,
299 U.S. 585 (1936); Pockomoke Guano Co. v. Eastern Transp. Co., 285 F. 7 (4th
Cir. 1922); In re Webster (The Yungay), 58 F.2d 352, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
47. "If lack of actual knowledge were enough, imbecility, real or assumed, on
the part of owners would be at a premium." The Argent, 1940 A.M.C. 508, 509
(S.D.N.Y. 1915); see, e.g., In re P. Sanford Ross, Inc., 204 F. 248, 251 (2d Cir. 1913); In
re Myers Excursion & Navigation Co. (The Republic) 61 F. 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1894).
48. See, e.g., The New Berne, 80 F.2d 244 (4th Cir. 1935); TheJames Horan, 78
F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 621 (1935); The Republic, 61 F. 109 (2d
Cir. 1894).
49. Sanbern v. Wright & Cobb Lighterage Co. 171 F. 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1909), aff'd,
179 F. 1021 (2d Cir. 1910).
50. Id. at 455.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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United States courts might grant limitation, however,
when the vessel involved is an oceangoing ship and the negli-
gent act did not take place at the vessel's home port.55 In The
Mormackite,5 6 the court granted limitation finding that the cor-
porate owner's managing officers had no notice of the im-
proper stowage of ore, which occurred in South American
ports in violation of the company's own rules. 57 Limitation
might be granted in England as it is unlikely the board of direc-
tors would have had knowledge of the improper stowage if the
managers had no knowledge of the violations.
Under United States law, the closer in time and space an
operating vessel is to the corporate headquarters, the greater
the degree of control the corporate owner will be required to
exercise over the master, crew, and subordinate employees. 58
In other words, the owner's "duty to control increases with the
possibility of control."'59 The English court does not consider
the "ability to control" of an employee other than a director in
deciding whether to grant limitation.
If the owner knows or should have known that the vessel
was unseaworthy prior to breaking ground, however, limitation
will be denied in the United States even if the ship is at sea or
in a foreign port. In The Pennsylvania,6 ° the port engineer who
supervised the maintenance and repair of all the owner's ships
knew that the vessel's hull was likely to crack in cold weather;
nonetheless, he failed to tell the master.6' During a voyage
through Alaskan waters, the vessel broke up and sank with a
55. See, e.g., Petitions of Kinsman Transit Co. (The MacGilvray Shiras), 338 F.2d
708 (2d Cir. 1964) (negligent mooring in Buffalo, New York, of a steamer owned by a
Cleveland, Ohio firm); Moore-McCormack Lines v. Armco Steel Corp. (The
Mormackite), 272 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1959) (negligent loading in foreign port); Ameri-
can Tobacco v. The Katingo Hadjipatera, 81 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (negligent
loading in foreign port); The Colima, 82 F. 665, (S.D.N.Y. 1897) (negligent loading).
56. The Mormackite, 272 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1959).
57. Id. at 877. The court held: "As was obviously necessary in foreign ports, it
was left to those in charge to follow these directions, and if they failed, their failure
did not charge the owners with 'privity or knowledge.'" Id.
58. Avera v. Florida Towing Co. (The Eileen Ross), 322 F.2d 155, 165 (5th Cir.
1963) (quoting G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 704 (1st ed. 1947)).
59. Id.
60. States S.S. Co. v. United States (The Pennsylvania), 259 F.2d 458 (9th Cir.
1957).
61. Id. at 468.
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loss of all hands.62 Thus, privity or knowledge is deemed to
exist when the owner has the means to learn of the un-
seaworthy condition, or when knowledge could have been ob-
tained from reasonable inspection.63
In sum, privity in the United States is attributed to the cor-
porate shipowner when a managing officer personally partici-
pates in the fault causing the casualty, or has knowledge or the
ability to know of the condition that led to the loss.
B. English Law
In the English case The Anonity, 64 the negligence of an em-
ployee, who left a galley stove burning while the vessel was
alongside an oil jetty, caused the destruction of the jetty by
fire.65 The shipowner sought to limit liability, contending that
the fire and damage occurred without his fault or privity, be-
cause a letter giving instructions regarding the extinction of
galley fires upon arrival at oil jetties had been sent by the
marine superintendent of the shipowner to all ships in the
fleet, including Anonity.6 6 Under the terms of the letter, the
matter was left in the hands of each vessel's master.
The court denied limitation in that case, holding that the
damage occurred because the shipowner failed to give proper
notice prohibiting the use of galley fires at berths.68 While the
master acknowledged receipt of the letter69 and admitted
showing it to the second and third officers, 70 he did not show it
to, nor did he inform, the ship's cook or crew. 7' The court
held that sending this letter was not enough to discharge the
corporation of its duty, 72 stating that some notice, permanently
displayed near the stove, prohibiting the use of galley fires
62. Id. at 460, 464.
63. Id.; see also China Union Lines, Ltd. v. A.O. Andersen & Co., 364 F.2d 769,
787 (5th Cir. 1966); Matter of Thebes Shipping Co. (The Argo Merchant), 486
F.Supp. 436 (D.N.Y. 1980).
64. F.T. Everard & Sons, Ltd. v. London and Thames Haven Oil Wharves, Ltd.
(The Anonity), [1961] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 118 (C.A.).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 121.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 124.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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near oil berths, was necessary. 73
The court stated, however, "it may be that [the shipowner]
could have avoided fault if he had delegated the urgent en-
forcement of it to Captain Wells [the marine superintendent],
and if it had been through the negligence of Captain Wells that
the urgency had lost its force."'74 Thus, in dicta, the court
stated that if the directors had instructed the marine superin-
tendent to require all masters to post notices of prohibition in
the galley, and if the superintendent had failed to instruct mas-
ters in this regard, the court might have granted limitation. A
United States court almost certainly would have denied limita-
tion under such circumstances; 75 the privity or knowledge of a
marine superintendant being sufficient to bind the corpora-
tion.76
This suggests that The Linseed King,77 might have been de-
cided differently under English law. The master knew of the
unseaworthy condition of the ferry and supervision of the ves-
sel was delegated to a marine superintendent who was not the
"directing mind and will" of the corporation under the hold-
ing of Lennard's, and in Linseed King.78
Over the past twenty years, however, the English courts
have restricted a corporate shipowner's ability to delegate his
duties. 79 Neverthless, a significant difference still exists since a
superintendent's knowledge may not necessarily bind the cor-
poration under English law.8 0
Under modem English admiralty law, the restriction on
the corporate shipowner's ability to delegate stems from the
decision in The Lady Gwendolen:81
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc. v. Hicks (The Linseed King), 285 U.S.
502 (1932).
76. See Sanbern v. Wright & Cobb Lighterage Co., 171 F. 449, 455 (S.D.N.Y.
1909); supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
77. The Linseed King, 285 U.S. at 502.
78. Id. at 511.
79. See The Marion, [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 156 (C.A.); Rederij Erven H. Groen
and Groen v. The "England" (Owners) and Others (The England), 1 [1973] Lloyd's
Rep. 373 (C.A.); The Dayspring, [1968] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 204 (Q.B. Adm. Ct.); The
Lady Gwendolen, [1965] Lloyd's Rep. 335 (C.A.).
80. See, e.g., The Garden City, [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. (Q.B. Adm. Ct.); Smitton v.
Orient Nay. Co., [1907] 12 Com. Cas. 270.
81. The Lady Gwendolen, [1964] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 99 (Q.B. Adm. Ct.).
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* . . if a set of circumstances exists of such high importance
in the operation of ships that the owners ought by reason-
able standards to give it their personal attention, they can-
not divest themselves of that duty by delegation. They must
see to it that they give instructions in that particular regard
and see and ensure that these instructions are carried out.8 2
In The Lady Gwendolen the defendant vessel collided with
another vessel because the proper function and use of radar
were never impressed upon her master, who believed that ra-
dar would enable him to continue-to operate his vessel at full
speed in fog.83 In affirming the Admiralty, the Court of Appeal
stated that insofar as high speed in fog was encouraged by ra-
dar, the installation of radar. required particular vigilance of
shipowners, through the person responsible, in the capacity of
the owners, for the running of the ships.8 4
The Marion 81 provides a recent example of differences be-
tween United States and English law on limitation of liability.
In 1977 Marion's anchor fouled an underwater oil pipeline, se-
verely damaging the pipeline.8 6 The shipowner admitted that
the damage was caused by the negligence of the ship's master,
who was navigating with an outdated chart that did not note
the presence of the pipeline. 7 Although the manager in
charge of the day-to-day operation of the vessel knew of the
unseaworthy condition aboard Marion, none of the firm's direc-
tors were informed of this condition."8 The Admiralty granted
limitation, holding that the assistant operations manager was
not the directing mind of the corporation, and that no director
was aware of the conditions aboard Marion.s°
82. Id. at 102.
83. Id. at 112. The court noted that at the time of the collision, radar was new to
merchant vessels. For this reason it was unreasonable for the shipowner not to alert
the master of the risks he was taking by operating his vessel, despite the use of radar,
at full speed in fog. Id. at 111-12.
84. The Lady Gwendolen, [1965] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 335, 339 (C.A.).
85. Grand Champion Tankers Ltd. v.,Norpipe A/S, [1984] 2 W.L.R. 942 (H.L.),
The Marion, [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 156 (C.A.), [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 52 (QB. Adm.
Ct.).
86, The Marion, [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 158.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. The Marion, [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 71. Until the decision in this case it was
believed in the United Kingdom that a prudent shipowner was entitled to regard the
provision of charts as the responsibility of the master unless the shipowner had good
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The owners of the pipeline appealed. 90 In accordance
with The Lady Gwendolen,9 ' the Court of Appeal denied limita-
tion.92 The court held that every shipowner has a duty to es-
tablish a system to detect a master's incompetence or to dele-
gate to an employee the responsibility of establishing such a
system.93 When the shipowner has delegated the duty to es-
tablish a system to a subordinate, he must also ascertain what
system the subordinate has implemented.94
United States courts would probably have denied limita-
tion in this case because the extent of an employee's responsi-
bility, not his title, determines whether limitation is fore-
closed.95 In The Marion, the assistant operations manager was
in charge of the day-to-day management of the vessel and was
aware of the unseaworthy condition that existed aboard the
reason to think that the master was not carrying out his responsibility. Id. at 64. On
February 5, 1976, the Marion was inspected by Liberian authorities as part of a system
of annual safety inspections of vessels sailing under the Liberian flag. [1983] 2
Lloyd's L.R. at 161. The inspection report expressly noted that the vessel's charts
had not been brought up to date. Id. As the corporate shipowner had no system for
the distribution of correspondence, the Liberian report was not seen by the corpora-
tion's managing director, who was absent on another project eighty percent of the
time. Id. at 161-62. The assistant operations manager who was in charge of the day-
to-day management of the vessel, immediately sent a letter to the Marion's master
instructing him to update the charts. Id. at 162. Following the dispatch of this letter,
the shipowner received from the master two requisitions for charts. Although the
assistant operations manager assumed that the orders contained in his letter were
being complied with, no action in fact was taken by the master to correct the Marion's
charts completely. Furthermore, no steps were taken to see what system for correc-
tion of charts was used by the master, who had been found wanting in this respect.
When the assistant operations manager visited the vessel in Hamburg, Federal Re-
public of Germany, in February 1977, he made a cursory examination of the charts
and no inquiry as to the system used to update the charts. Shortly after this visit, the
casualty occurred. Id.
90. The Marion, [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 156.
91. The Lady Gwendolen, [1964] 2 Lloyd'd Rep. 99 (Q.B. Adm. Ct.); [1965] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 335 (C.A.).
92. The Marion, [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 165 (C.A.).
93. Id. at 166-67.
[T]here is a residual responsibility in the owner or his alter ego either to
establish a system which will provide some kind of managerial check to de-
tect the incompetent master or alternatively to delegate to a responsible
subordinate the establishing of that system and then subsequently to en-
quire as to the nature of the system to ensure that it will throw up random
but serious failures on the part of those responsible.
Id.
94. Id.
95. In re P. Sanford Ross, Inc., 204 F. 248, 251 (2d Cir. 1913).
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vessel.96 Under United States law, such knowledge and discre-
tionary powers of the superintendant would be imputed to the
corporation.97
Although both United States and English courts would to-
day deny limitation in a situation similar to that of The
Marion,98 they would do so for significantly different reasons.
In England, if a shipowner delegates a duty such as the detec-
tion of navigational errors to a "qualified subordinate", 99 the
shipowner could limit his liability, unless he knew before the
casualty that the subordinate was incompetent.100 Further, if
the shipowner adopted a system that subsequently failed, Eng-
lish law would still permit limitation of liability, although the
shipowner would then be required to correct the faults in the
system.101
Thus, if Marion's manager was responsible for a system
designed to ensure that Marion had updated charts, and if the
manager failed to exercise this responsibility, Marion's owner
would have been protected.' 0 2  In contrast, under United
96. See supra note 89.
97. In re P. Sanford Ross, Inc., 204 F. at 251. In The Marion, counsel for the
pipeline owners attempted to use United States law:
[W]here a person is entrusted with all the management of ... a significant
part of the company's business, his acts will be deemed to be the acts of the
company .... [T]o constitute fault of the company the negligence must be
that of an executive officer, manager or superintendent whose scope of au-
thority includes independent discretion to supervise the phase of business
out of which the loss or injury occurred.
[1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 70 (QB. Adm. Ct.). The admiralty court rejected this argu-
ment as being "too broad." Id.
98. See supra notes 45-63 and 85-97 and accompanying text.
99. The Marion, [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 156, 167 (C.A.). The Marion court does
not define "qualified subordinate." It seems, however, that it is a relative term. For
example, a marine engineer whose experience is in the engine room of seagoing
vessels would not be qualified to establish and maintain a system designed to detect
incompetent navigation. See Id.
100. Id. at 167. "The duty to supervise.., can itself be delegated . . . to an
appropriately qualified subordinate such as a marine superintendent .... Until some-
thing occurs which indicates that the superintendent is not competent, the owner
should be protected." Id.
101. Id. at 169.
The primary duty of a shipowner is to have a proper system for managing
his vessels. If he has such a system and things go awry, as they still can do
for few reasonable systems are totally fool-proof and fail-safe, ... he will
certainly have to review his system in light of that experience.
Id.
102. See supra notes 99-101.
1986-1987]
352 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 10:388
States law, the manager would have been defined as a manag-
ing officer of the corporate shipowner, and his knowledge
would be deemed that of the corporation. 103 This distinction
is significant, as the damages claimed by the pipeline owner
and others who suffered consequential losses exceeded
U.S.$25,000,000.1 0 4  If limitation was granted, however, the
owners of Marion would have been able to limit their liability to
U.S.$982,292.06.1 0 5
III. THE CONTINUING CONFLICT
The conflicting standards are so deeply ingrained within
their respective legal systems that changes are unlikely.' 0 6 A
103. See, e.g., In re P. Sanford Ross, Inc., 204 F. 248 (2d Cir. 1913).
104. The Marion, [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 156.
105. Id.
106. It is unlikely that any nation will unilaterally repeal its limitation statute,
because to do so would herald the demise of its merchant fleet. Elimination of the
ability to limit liability would severely hinder the ability of a merchant fleet to com-
pete in international commerce, in that it would result in higher operating costs be-
cause insurance premiums would soar dramatically. See Note, Shipowner's Limited Lia-
bility, 3 COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 105, 114 (1967). The cost of basic liability insur-
ance for shipowners (Protection and Indemnity Insurance) is determined by the
ability of the owner to limit his liability. Id. "The standard Protection and Indemnity
policy provides that the entire policy is subject to cancellation should there be any
change in the law of limitation of liability." Id. In addition, the possibility of a ship-
owner limiting his liability causes many claimants to settle for amounts less than what
might be received if limitation were denied. The loss of this bargaining tool would
likewise cause an increase in premiums. Id. at 115. Another important benefit of
limitation that would be lost is the forced adjudication of all claims in one court at
one time. This is one of the chief economic benefits under the limitation statute. Id.
at 115-16. Although the disadvantages caused domestic shipowners by the loss of a
limitation statute might be reduced by the denial of limitation to foreign shipowners,
foreign retaliation in the form of a denial of the benefits of foreign limitation laws
could result. See Note, Shipowners' Limitation of Liability-New Directions for an Old Doc-
trine, 16 STAN. L. REV. 370, 390 (1964); G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 4, at 822.
Critics of the limitation doctrine direct their hostility toward the limitation doctrine,
not the shipping industry. Id. at 822. The United States and Great Britain realize the
political and military value of their merchant fleets. For example, Great Britain could
not have achieved its victory in the 1982 Falkland Islands War without the extensive
use of requisitioned British merchant vessels, which comprised a significant number
(54) of their South Atlantic Task Force. The majority were British flag vessels requi-
sitioned by the Ministry of Defense. These vessels performed various functions in-
cluding logistic support, use as hospital ships, minesweeping, and even as makeshift
aircraft carriers. See, e.g., M. HASTINGS & S. JENKINS, THE BATrLE FOR THE FALKLANDS
87-89 (1983). For a concise debate regarding the importance of a domestic merchant
marine in time of war, see C.H. WHITHURST JR., THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE: IN
SEARCH OF AN ENDURING MARITIME POLICY, app. F. (critique of Office of Management
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comparison of the two standards, however, reveals problems
with the English standard that warrant a consideration for
change. Until the early part of this century, United States
courts almost uniformly granted limitation. 0 7 Limitation was
favored in order to encourage investment in the United States
merchant fleet.' 0 8 Over the past fifty years, however, enthusi-
asm for the limitation doctrine has waned'0 9 within the legal
community, especially in the courts, because the doctrine has
outlived its purpose of providing an incentive for maritime in-
vestment 1 0 since insurance and the corporate form protect the
shipowner. " It
Obsolescence does not, however, empower the courts to
disregard the statutes" 2 of their nations," 3 but it does affect
how courts are likely to interpret these statutes."' The "fault
and Budget (OMB) Memorandum on the National Security Justification for a United
States-Flag Merchant Marine).
107. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 4, at 821.
108. See University of Tex. Medical Branch at Galveston v. United States, 557
F.2d 438, 441 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978).
109. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 4, at 821.
110. Pettus v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 322 F. Supp. 1078, 1082 (W.D. Pa.
1971). "[Tlhe doctrine of limitation of liability is an anachronism in this present day
and age." Id. at 1082.
"Many of the conditions in the shipping industry which induced the 1851 Con-
gress to pass the Act no longer prevail. And later Congresses, when they wished to
aid shipping, provided subsidies paid out of the public treasury rather than subsidies
paid by injured persons." Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 407, 437
(1954) (Black, J., dissenting).
11. University of Tex. Medical Branch at Galveston, 557 F.2d at 454.
In addition, the theoretical reason for the doctrine, that is the protection of own-
ers who lack control over the vessel while it is at sea, no longer exists as radio com-
munication has increased the owner's control over his vessel. Waterman S.S. Corp.
v. Gay Cottons, 414 F.2d 724, 734 (9th Cir. 1969). The court went on, however, to
state:
Although modem communication and transportation facilities make all acts
performed in any foreign port within the potential control of the shipowner,
we believe that an extension of the requirement of privity or knowledge to-
cover all such acts should only come from Congress. We are unwilling to
impose on all shipowners the burden of maintaining at every port of call an
agent with authority over maintenance and repair. We are equally unwilling
to transmute the master into such an agent whenever the ship calls at a for-
eign port in which the owner does not have such an agent.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
112. Limitation Act, supra note 1; Merchant Shipping Act, supra note 1.
113. Continental Oil Co. v. Bonanza Corp., 706 F.2d 1365, 1376 (5th Cir.
1983).
114. Id.
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or privity" clause of the English statute' 15 might be interpreted
more broadly, so that when an employee is entrusted with the
management of a significant part of a corporation's business,
his acts will be deemed to be those of the corporation." 6 The
present standard may be an unreasonable misinterpretation of
Lennard's. 1 17
English courts continue to interpret Lennard's as requiring
that the fault or privity be that of a director.' 18 Thus, even
when the negligence of a marine superintendent, who may ex-
ercise broad discretionary powers, causes damage or injury,
the corporation will be able to limit its liability, if it had a
"proper system to detect faults"'' 9 and was unaware of the su-
perintendent's errors or incompetence.
20
Lennard's 121 may require that fault be ascribed to a director
or someone with coordinate powers as granted by the articles
of incorporation in order for limitation to be denied. 22 Len-
nard's should not, however, be so limited by its own terms.
The Lennard's court stated that since a corporation is an
abstraction and has no mind of its own, someone must be
found who is the directing mind and will of the corporation to
115. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 135-144 and accompanying text.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., The Marion, [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 52, 71 (Q.B. Adm. Ct.); The
Garden City, [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 382, 398 (QB. Adm. Ct.).
119. The Marion, [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 156, 169 (C.A.).
120. The Garden City, [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 391. In The Garden City, limitation
was granted under such circumstances, the collision of two ships in thick fog. Id. at
384. The owner of the vessel deemed at fault (a Polish corporation) was allowed to
limit its liability because it took steps to ensure that its vessels were properly navi-
gated in fog. Id. at 399-400. The corporate shipowner had instituted a system of
inspection by which, after every voyage, the company's chief navigator or one of his
staff would go on board every vessel of the company when it returned to a Polish
port. Id. at 390. The court held that the failure of the chief navigator and his staff to
detect all the instances of improper navigation by the master over the seven months
immediately preceding the collision, and to take sterner measures to prevent a repe-
tition, was the cause of the casualty. Id. at 391. Relying on the Lennard's decision, the
court held that neither the chief navigator nor his staff was the directing mind and
will of the company. Id. at 398-99. The court held that the cause of the collision was
not the fault of the directors because there was a system for detection of faults (de-
spite its subsequent failure) and the directors were unaware that the chief navigator
had failed to detect instances of improper navigation. Id. at 392, 399-400. Thus,
limitation was granted. Id. at 400.
121. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
122. Id.
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ascertain whether the corporation had privity or knowledge of
the circumstances causing the casualty.' 23 If that person was at
fault or had knowledge of the circumstances, the corporation
will be denied limitation beause that individual's fault will be
attributed to the corporation.' 24 The court went on to state
that the person may be under the direction of the shareholders;
that person may be the board of directors; or that person may
have authority co-ordinate with the board of directors given by
the articles of association. 125 The House of Lords, however,
never stated that the person must be one of the aforementioned
individuals. 126
Limitation was denied because the individual whom the
House of Lords determined was the directing mind and will of
the corporation failed to take the stand and testify as to his
knowledge of the conditions which lead to the casualty. The
burden to rebut the presumption of liability falls upon the
party raising the defense of lack of privity.127 Because the indi-
vidual never testified, the Lords were not certain as to his exact
position in the corporate hierarchy. 28 The Lords held, how-
ever, that he was the directing mind and will of the corpora-
tion, as he managed the operations of the corporation's ves-
sel. 129 The decision that his active management of the corpo-
ration's vessel deemed him the directing mind and will of the
corporation parallels United States admiralty law in that re-
sponsibility, not title, determines whether an individual's fault
is imputed to the corporation.
123. Lennard's Carrying Co., Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co., Ltd. 1915 A.C. 705,
713 (H.L.).
124. Id.
125. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
126. Id. Lord Justice Wilmer in his opinion in The Lady Gwendolen, [1965] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 335, 345 (C.A.), stated in dicta that the Lennard's opinion did not hold
that the person whose fault would be the company's fault must be a director. He
emphasized that the circumstances of each case must be examined before determin-
ing whether an individual's fault binds the corporation, and where an individual is
responsible for the management of a corporation's vessels, his actions should be re-
garded as the actions of the corporation. Id.
127. Lennard's Carrying Co., Ltd., 1915 A.C. at 714.
128. Id. at 713-14.
129. Id.
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A. The Marion: A Lost Opportunity for Resolution
The Marion 130 provided an opportunity for a present reso-
lution of the current conflict between United States and Eng-
lish admiralty law. The facts indicate that a supervisory em-
ployee in charge of the day-to-day operations of the vessel
knew of the conditions aboard Marion which contributed to the
accident. 31 While the English admiralty court granted limita-
tion, under United States law limitation would probably have
been denied. ' 3 2
The Court of Appeal reversed the Admiralty Court deci-
sion in The Marion on different grounds and the House of
Lords affirmed the reversal, stating that limitation would be
denied because of the corporation's failure to have a system of
managerial checks.133 As a result, The Marion may divert at-
tempts to adopt a broader standard.' 34 However, as neither
the Court of Appeal nor the House of Lords rejected argu-
ments for adoption of a broader standard, both might still
change their postion.
Some person must be found whose fault or privity is that
of the corporation, else the corporation could always limit its
liability.' 35 Both English and United States courts speak of this
person whose acts or knowledge are imputed to the corpora-
tion as the "alter ego" of the corporation.' 36
Corporations operate through a chain of command where
authority, responsiblity, and power are delegated, as it is im-
possible for any one person or even the entire board of direc-
tors to manage the daily transactions and operations of a mod-
ern corporation. 37 A board of directors is more likely to be
involved with fiscal planning and ratification of management's
plans than it is with the day-to-day operation of the corpora-
130. The Marion, [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 52 (QB. Adm. Ct.), rev'd, [1983] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 156 (C.A.), aff'd sub nom., Grand Champion Tankers Ltd. v. Norpipe
A/S, [1984] 2 W.L.R. 942 (H.L.).
131. The Marion, [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 158 (C.A.).
132. In re P. Sanford Ross, Inc., 204 F. 248, 251 (2d Cir. 1913).
133. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
135. Coryell v. Phipps (The Seminole), 317 U.S. 406, 410-11 (1913).
136. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
137. SeeJ. RIGGS, L. BETHEL, F. ATWATER, G. SMITH & H. STACKMAN, JR., INDUS-
TRIAL ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 36 (6th ed. 1979) [hereinafterJ. RIGGS].
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tion.' 38 Hence, in a shipowning corporation, for example, the
board of directors may delegate discretionary management au-
thority to supervisory personnel over property worth millions
of dollars and capable of causing extensive property dam-
age. 1 39 These individuals qualify as the "alter ego" of the cor-
poration, for they are, in essence running the corporation.
The English standard requiring membership on the
board 40 or powers co-ordinate with the board' 4 1 given by the
articles of incorporation is impractical, as it ignores the man-
agement and organizational practices of corporations.142 Even
with the requirement that the board establish a system of man-
agerial checks 143 the standard is inadequate. It promotes igno-
rance on the part of the board, of directors until a failed or
faulty system is brought to the board's attention. Moreover, if
supervisory personnel are at fault when the casualty occurs the
English courts will grant limitation if the board is unaware of
their fault. 144 Protecting the corporation from the acts of su-
pervisory personnel grants the corporation too much protec-
tion from the consequences of carelessness.
CONCLUSION
Despite restrictions on delegating over the past twenty
years, it is still easier for a shipowner to limit his liability under
English admiralty law. Even if a supervisory employee knew of
the condition which caused the casualty, limitation will be
granted if the board of directors had a system for managerial
checks in place. The differences in the damage award can be
dramatic if a court allows the shipowner to delegate. A
broader standard, similar to the standard applied in United
States admiralty law, in determining which acts can be imputed
to the corporation would fairly protect the interests of both the
shipowner and the claimants.
138. See A. CHANDLER, JR., THE UNITED STATES: SEEDBED OF MANAGERIAL CAPI-
TALISM, MANAGERIAL HIERARCHIES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE RISE OF THE
MODERN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 14 (A. Chandler, Jr. & H. Daems eds. 1980); J.
RIGGS, supra note 137, at 36.
139. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 20.
141. Id.
142. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
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The doctrine of limiting the liability of the shipowner was
created to protect the investment of shipowners in a trade
fraught with peril. While a ship is at sea, it is at the mercy of
nature's forces. It is assumed that no one would invest capital
in such ventures, unless the right existed to limit liability due
to losses incurred under the exigent circumstances of naviga-
tion on the high seas.
Furthermore, a careful reading of the Lennard's decision
indicates that the individual in charge of the daily management
of a vessel is the "alter ego" of a corporation and, therefore,
the'individual to look to in order to establish whether a casu-
alty occurred with or without a corporation's fault or privity.
Such a standard, enumerated by the House of Lords in Len-
nard's, reflects that of the United States courts even though it
has not been so interpreted in England.
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